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Methodological procedures
and ethical decisions
Procedimentos metódicos e decisões éticas
Franklin Leopoldo e Silva 5
The article being commented here questions the
adequacy for qualitative research of the ethical
guidelines established by resolution 196/96 due
the positivist paradigm that, according to the
authors, would be orienting the mentioned reso-
lution with regard to the profile of scientific re-
search. Furthermore, the presence of this para-
digm in a great number of other documents in
the field of research ethics would be responsible
for the inexistence of appropriate criteria for un-
derstanding health research when guided by pa-
rameters proper to human sciences.
The subject is immense, not only insofar as
the epistemological aspects involved are con-
cerned but also as refers to the scope of the do-
main of ethics. Before approaching some specific
points it seems opportune to call attention to a
question of general character.
by people throughout their lives but also by soci-
eties, organizations and institutions, needless to
say by the scientific community along with the
activities scientists and researchers perform.
Besides the arguments presented by Guerrie-
ro and Dallari1, to highlight the peculiarity of
qualitative research based on other paradigms
than the positivist one, I am confident that the
adoption of the ethical principle of Unit-Diversi-
ty offers us room to reflection about ethical rec-
ommendations following research models re-
specting paradigms diversity and justifies the nec-
essary changes of the 196/962 Resolution. I truly
believe that this principle can help us to have more
flexibility in research under the social-human and
health sciences scope in constructive and inter-
pretative paradigms.
That reflection, in our opinion, is much more
adequate to the true scientific spirit: to recognize
and respect differences, consequential of differ-
ent ways to see the world, but adequately built
upon the researchers’ compromise, their moral
judgment, their ethics, their acceptation of their
pairs in accordance with social and moral rules
of the culture they belong to, leading the ones in
charge of legislating to act accordingly.
I do hope that the considerations here pre-
sented will contribute to widen the debate about
moral principles in scientific research as I have
proposed in the beginning, transferring it to the
process of knowledge, to methods and proce-
dures able to access them in a more proper way
and consequently to raise the awareness that each
model of research and each situation to be re-
searched need specific ethical rules.
Certainly, this would make the scientific activ-
ity of the researchers and of the committees of
ethics in research, a lot easier, contributing to a
higher develop-ment of knowledge as inadequate
models of judg-ment bring dissonant aspects,
which can in turn provoke major difficulties to
some projects to be approved.
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1. The instrumental character of the objectivist
paradigm. It must be repeated that the understand-
ing of modern knowledge contrasts, in Bacon, with
the contemplative ideal of the antiquity and the
Middle Ages; know the question is knowing na-
ture in order to dominating it and make it serve
human purposes. In this sense, technique is not
something derived from science or its fortuitous
product. Technique is deeply imbedded in the vo-
cation of modern science, is part of its essence.
Only from the basis of this inseparability modern
science can define itself at the same time as knowl-
edge and domination – as dominating knowledge.
This instrumental bias manifests clearly in the
character of objectivity if we, like Descartes, are to
understand the objective as a reality methodically
constituted from the representation of the sub-
ject, center and building axis of knowledge, tech-
nique and ethics, seen as an undissociable whole
in the big rational unity of systematic knowledge.
The contemporary technological development of
the industrial revolution in a certain way already
pointed to the reality we are living today, in which
a separation of basic science from technological
applications is senseless in view of the new unity
represented by technoscience.
2. Human Sciences and intersubjectivity. The
instrumental character of the objectivist paradigm
ought to have raised ethical questions in the field
of human sciences if they, since the beginning, had
defined themselves as knowledge in which Man is
subject and object at the same time. This did not
happen due to the dominion of the objectivist
paradigm, which in this regard assumed that all
knowledge has to constitute itself as subject-ob-
ject relation. This methodological assumption gave
rise to a bifurcation of the subject so that it could
also appear as the object of the “Human Scienc-
es”, what finds a remote precedence in the Carte-
sian reflection according to which the subject looks
at itself in order to find itself as object.  The objec-
tivist theory leveled subject and object under the
pretext of separating them methodologically. This
is the reason why intersubjectivity remained a
philosophical problem: when it comes to seeing it
scientifically, intersubjectivity should transform
into an objectified phenomenon – in a relation
objectively exposed to the theoretical vision of a
knowing subject.
Thus, given the imperative need of objectiviz-
ing the subject, the relation between researcher
and researched is never seen as a case of inter-
subjectivity. The methodological demand for
objectivation does not allow a relation of knowl-
The knowledge forming the big area defined
as Health is quite diversified covering the three
great divisions of science: exact, natural and hu-
man. As a matter of fact, research into the field of
health involves areas ranging from statistical math-
ematics to the singularity of individual socio-psy-
chological behavior, crosscutting geography, chem-
istry, biology and others.  That being so, there
arises the difficulty to configure this diversity in a
way that would allow us to refer to it as a whole, a
unity, or at least as something sufficiently defined
in its possibilities and limitations. For overcom-
ing this difficulty and reaching this relative unity
one chooses among the sectors composing the
area those with really unquestionable characteris-
tics of scientificity and whose criteria and scientific
objectivity are clearly beyond question.
Thus, the choice falls on those research direc-
tions whose object or method is offering the typ-
ical image of scientific investigation according to
standards based on kantism and positivism, con-
sidered the epistemological axes composing the
modern idea of knowledge. Another contribut-
ing factor is that during the period of the meth-
odological constitution of human sciences, most
of these criteria were reaffirmed as factors of sci-
entificity, the specificities of the knowledge about
the human reality then constructed notwith-
standing. The sovereignty of the traditional par-
adigm, this way strengthened on occasion of the
very advent of human sciences, was sometimes
criticized, mostly in the philosophical sphere, but
not placed in check with a vigor similar to that
with which for example the new physics ques-
tioned the paradigms of the aristotelic tradition.
As a consequence, the general image of sci-
ence is still widely based on the positivist para-
digm, just the way it was consolidated in the XIX
century and refined by the discussions run in the
XX century, by the theories of science and by the
contributions of the history of sciences. The
benchmark thus arising is to such an extent
present in the conception of scientific knowledge
that it figures as a norm or regulating idea even
on the horizon of human sciences, a fact strongly
favored by the sciences which, although dealing
with aspects of the human reality, are doing this
according to entirely positivist theoretical as-
sumptions and operational schemes, economy
and a great part of psychology for example. All
this results in a variety of problems for qualita-
tive health research. Here we will only highlight
two of them, directly or indirectly approached in
the commented article.
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O autor responde
The author replies
The debater’s texts are very well written and with
a sound basis, which is not surprising consider-
ing that they are all experienced authors. As Fran-
klin Leopoldo puts it, [...] our starting point was
the acknowledgement that the general image that
we have of science is still that of the positivist par-
adigm, as found in the 19th Century, which is also
situated as a norm of regulating idea in the hu-
manistic sciences, by and large including Psycholo-
gy. We partially agree with this statement, since
Psychology was founded as an independent sci-
ence in the midst of a crisis: how to reach objectiv-
ity – seen as essential for the production of mod-
ern scientific knowledge – if this knowledge is pro-
duced by an individual with their own subjectivi-
ty? How to apply the scientific method – planned
for the Natural Sciences – to the study of subjec-
tivity? Different psychologists have sought several
ways of carrying out their pieces of research and
have, from the beginning, made explicit two op-
posing lines of thought: one that believes that chal-
lenge lies in the development of a scientific Psy-
chology – as per criteria set forth by the Natural
Sciences -, and another that understands that Psy-
chology should seek its own methodology, since
its object of study is not apprehensible by the
former method. The difference found in this
search for the most appropriate method, or the
method that may be possible for this area is still
present at the basis of the many existent schools
of thought in Psychology. However, to find out
the opinion of “the majority of the” psychologists
would require specific study. This statement, none-
theless, leads us to the importance of acknowl-
edging that what is at stake are the different scien-
tific paradigms and not the different professional
categories, since, as Franklin points out, there are
actually different standpoints even among psy-
chologists. Thus, being within the “Social Sciences
and the Humanities” does not guarantee that ideas
are shared. Will van den Hoonaard also calls at-
tention to this when he states that there are differ-
ent ways of defining research and that, for this
reason, there are qualitative researchers that do
not consider this kind of work a different para-
digm. Franklin Leopoldo also states that “[...]
modern science can be defined both as knowledge
and dominance – as dominating knowledge.” This
power relationship transcends that of nature dom-
inance and is established among humans, thus,
the relationship between the researcher and the
edge between two subjects to be established. The
ethical implication of this last point seems very
clear but, as one can observe, there is an intimate
relation with the first, as it were a continuation;
the ethical question is present in both and cannot
be separated from the epistemological approach.
In fact, if the conditions of objectivation in the
humanities are to be maintained it would be com-
pletely impropriate to define any research involv-
ing two subjects as intersubjectivity. In this case
however it must be pointed out that - the alter-
native being the relation subject-object - the vi-
sion of the other as object arises as a necessary
requirement, and thus the correlated ethical prob-
lems will inevitably appear.
The most interesting is that this menace of
reification is arising from the humanist ambi-
tion to use knowledge for extending the domin-
ion of Man over things. The paradox of human-
ism consists in the fact that its historical persis-
tence, encouraged by the progress of science and
technique, might end up in a vision depriving the
human being from its humanity, shall say, com-
pletely substituting the subject by the object.
Such effects are not perceived in all their seri-
ousness and ethical extent because they occur first
in form of methodological requirements of ob-
jective rigor, adherence to which would be natu-
ral in a scientific research. Thus, an ethics com-
mission will search in a submitted protocol for
those requisites usually considered marks of sci-
entificity and, once identified, the commission will
try to find out if the proponents took the precau-
tions necessary in research involving humans,
informed consent for example.
The crucial question posed in the article is
about what the commissions will not find because
they were not looking for it: specific research pro-
cedures in an investigation that in no moment
considers the human subject an object. In this case
the methodological procedures are so to say a
continuation of the ethical precautions because
none of the phases of the research would have
been conceived according to positivist and objec-
tivist criteria. The question raised by the article is
if the ethics commissions are prepared for exam-
ining projects of this other nature.
This is the reason for the recommendation to
revise and amplify the normative resolutions
making them contemplate these cases. In this
sense, the article points not only to the need for
epistemological reflection about the paradigms of
scientificity in force but also for ethical reflection
reaching beyond a critical examination of this
model.
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subject of research is never seen as a case of inter-
subjectivity since the latter must necessarily be ob-
jectified. Objectification as a methodological re-
quirement does not allow for the establishment of a
knowledge relationship between two subjects.”
Franklin Leopoldo brilliantly discusses one of the
chore issues at stake, when he points out that the
Committees of Ethics in Research - CEPs “[...]
will not find specific procedures for  research in
which the human subject is not, at any time, taken
as an object, because they have not sought it.”
This is indeed a central issue which radically chang-
es the quality of relationship between researcher
and researched, and it should be considered in the
ethical analysis of these projects, which are already
taking the necessary steps to acknowledge and re-
spect the “other” who is involved in the research.
Cynthia Sarti also highlights this matter when she
refers to the free and informed consent given by
the researched, or as she puts it: “The procedure
by which the consent is given depends on how the
researcher-researched relationship is established
and developed […]”. In hierarchical relationships,
such as the ones seen in the professional-patient
relationship, there can be – and there usually is –
the identification of knowledge and power which,
as Cynthia reasons, would lead us to the risk of
symbolic violence. Qualitative researches, howev-
er, are carried out with human beings, and seek to
establish a dialogical relationship.
Rosa Macedo points out the importance of
respecting different scientific paradigms due to
the fact that the adoption of a method – regard-
less of whether it is qualitative or quantitative –
must be coherent with the “[...] concept of reality
and the knowledge process within that reality.”
Referring to the “dramatic paradigmatic change
established by the cybernetic-systemic approach”,
she states that “reality can only become knowl-
edge when the subject that perceives it gives it
meaning by naming it.” Therefore, “the paradigm
that supports theory and experimentation is de-
constructed, and an intersubjectivity-based al-
ternative is constructed.”  The need to “objectify”
the “object” of study (even if it is a human being)
is thus overcome. Now the proposal is that knowl-
edge be produced in this intersubjective locus,
which assumes the need for the interaction be-
tween – at least – two subjects. Cynthia Sarti goes
along the same direction when she maintains, “if
the relationship is not adequately established for
both parties, the research per se will not be feasi-
ble.” This highlights that in such researches, eth-
ical and methodological aspects are intertwined.
Margareth Angelo also considers the consent as
a process, and that the questions that arise are
identified by means of a dialogue that is carefully
conducted with sensitivity and respect. These are
qualities that cannot be prescribed, controlled or
intellectually applied: they must be authentically
felt and experienced [...] in the relationship. They
emerge within the engagement of the researcher’s
self with the other (the participant), in mutually
respectable manners [...] they are ethically imper-
ative, even if not ethically prescribed; they are
learnt in the most fundamental of human experi-
ence. For this very reason, if these researches are
evaluated merely by their formal aspects – such
as the written consent term – one could consider
them not to be in conformity with the Brazilian
norms of ethics in research, when, in fact, what
happens is precisely the opposite: because the eth-
ical aspects are inseparably incorporated to the
researcher’s routine, they do not feel the need to
record such terms in writing. Or the researcher
could even consider that “putting it in writing”
would distance the relationship which had been
so carefully built with the researched. Therefore,
instead of protecting the subject of the research,
the procedure jeopardizes the study – which
might even have been planned with the researched.
Thus, unwillingly, the CONEP-CEP system is
stepping back when it requires that procedures -
which have already been overcome in the kinds
of researches discussed here - are followed, on
the grounds that deciding the objective and the
procedures together with the researched commu-
nity is much more than requesting consent for
taking part in a research designed solely by the
researcher. The quality of data collection/genera-
tion, as well as their analysis will depend on the
relationship established between the researcher
and the researched. Besides, the very knowledge
validation process will depend on the dialogue
between the two parties, besides peer approval.
Cynthia Sarti advances when she affirms that:
Therefore, in order to validate itself, every scien-
tific area of study is constituted from the dialogue
between the researcher and their peers; in Anthro-
pology it is also based on the conditions established
in dialogues between researcher and researched.
After all, as Will van den Hoonaard reminds us,
the forte of qualitative research is its ability to
show how the researched understands and expe-
riences their social world – which will lead the
researcher to check with the researched if their
understanding was adequate.
In the context in which the researched is not
an “object” of study, and in which the researcher
is, as Will van den Hoonaard points out, part of
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We agree with Cynthia when she states that
“there is consensus as to the need to normalize
research procedures, in their ethical aspects, in all
epistemological areas.” However, in qualitative
researches that are framed within interpretative
and critical paradigms, ethics becomes intrinsic
to methodological aspects. Thus, the task which
the CONEP-CEP system has when analyzing
qualitative research would be to verify if they are
consistently designed, since the possibility of eth-
ical inadequacies is intimately related to an in-
consistent project, possibly designed by research-
ers whose methodological background was in-
adequate. This is also the concern put forward
by Margareth Angelo when stating that: “The
qualitative researcher needs to be solidly educat-
ed […]” As stated by Will van den Hoonaard,
when qualitative research migrates from the
realm of social and humanistic sciences, and are
adopted by other professionals – as occurs in the
collective health – the methodologies themselves
are changed. One needs to pay close attention to
these changes, to see if they bring new ideas, but
maintain internal consistency, or if they were
modified with no knowledge of their background.
In the analysis of papers that were indexed at
MEDLINE1, we identified conflicts that, in actual
fact, were a result of lack of clarity from the re-
searcher’s part about their own place in the re-
search field – a matter so intensely discussed in
the Social Sciences and the Humanities, and that
might have gone unnoticed by professionals of
other areas. To summarize, we can say that there
is a lot to explicit on the different notions of qual-
itative research and about the scope of specific
guidelines for the analysis of their ethical aspect.
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the produced knowledge, the researcher has the
sole responsibility over their own acts. Rosa Mace-
do restates Ravn’s proposal and claims “unity and
diversity” as ethical principles, both expressing
“distinct, yet complementary moments”. She con-
cludes that “[...] the problem is established when
one (unity or diversity) is carried out to the total
detriment of the other (unity or diversity).”
Along the same line, Cynthia Sarti considers
that the problem is the “hegemony of one over
the other”, which is what happens in Resolution
196/96 and its complementary regulations –
which adopt a research concept referenced in the
post-positivist paradigm and claims to be appli-
cable to all types of researches.
The debaters emphasize that qualitative re-
search must be consistent and scientific sound,
and must consider the historical backgrounds. It
is important to remember Rosa Macedo’s words:
[...] the planning of any activity aiming at knowl-
edge construction, including research, must adapt
to the notion of reality and to the knowledge pro-
cess of that reality, by using methods that are com-
patible to such notion so as to have adequate, co-
herent access to it. This shows that there is no
methodology that is hovering in the air. On the
contrary, they must be firmly founded in the par-
adigm that guides the researcher’s work, who, in
turn, must be coherent with the theoretical frame
adopted. Besides, it is also important to say that,
although we have focused on qualitative research,
there is no intention on our part to dichotomize
between qualitative and quantitative methods
and techniques, since they can all be used in dif-
ferent paradigms, and even in the same study,
bringing important and different information
that, when well organized, will contribute to the
understanding of phenomena and their complex-
ity. The need for specific guidelines for social and
humanistic sciences is grounded on the fact that
many of the researchers from these areas adopt
interpretative and critical paradigms, which rad-
ically differ from the post-positivist paradigm
adopted by the Resolution 196/96. We also need
to highlight Cynthia Sarti’s statement that in the
Social Sciences and the Humanities, different par-
adigms coexist, and this allows for the “coexist-
ence of distinct frames”.  It would not be the role
of the guidelines on ethics in research to establish
hegemony of one over others. In fact, this would
be ethically inadequate.
